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Abstract. We intend to draw attention to a topic in practical argumentation that is
complex, unavoidable and of substantial consequence in social, political and eco-
nomical terms: polemics. Our target is a rather frequent —and far from trivial—
type of polemics, those that are generated around action proposals that affect pub-
lic well-being. Our aim is to develop a framework to identify the argumentative
components of an actual controversy and eventually provide means to intervene
in the ongoing disputation. With that focus, in this paper we outline the basic ele-
ments of a conceptual framework that will allow us to map the topic and articulate
some salient opportunities.
1 Introduction
In loose terms, a polemic (from the greek pioλµικo´ς , “of war”) is an exchange of con-
troversial opinions concerning a proposal that affects conflicting interests. On prima
facie, what distinguishes polemics to other types of dialectical conflicts is the fluidity
of the contentious issues and the apparent lack of compliance with common dialogical
conventions. Such chaotic image of polemics has been a reason to dismiss it as a worth-
less endeavour, a “parasitic figure on discussion” or as a means to avoid agreement [6]
p 382. However, one may take a more positive attitude and look into polemical debates
where the disputation has objective impact in the world and one can make sense of the
process albeit its actual complexity. This second type of polemics is the one we mean
to study. This paper is an invitation to the ArgMAS community to participate in that
study.
In this paper we argue that polemics is a research topic that we believe is promising,
fertile, of value to society and within the scope of current work in argumentation in
multiagent systems. Towards that end, we introduce some conceptual distinctions and
outline in very rough terms some research opportunities that we think are of interest for
the ArgMAS community.
We propose to start the study of Polemics with a descriptive approach whose goal is
to provide a conceptual framework to make sense of an ongoing polemic. Such concep-
tual framework should allow the identification of those entities and those events in the
real world that are relevant to a polemic; and provide a representation of the disputation
process that serves to articulate arguments and dialogues —that involve those entities—
in an intelligible way. The descriptive approach that we propose would entail the de-
velopment not only of the formal artefacts involved in the intelligible representation of
polemics but also the technological artefacts that support the identification of relevant
entities and the representation of an actual polemic that involves them, in an automated
or semi-automated way.
This paper is a timid step in that direction. It is an invitation, the first strokes of
an outline of a potential conceptual framework and a call to arms. It is organised as
follows: First we motivate the topic in informal terms Sec. 2 and illustrate the type
of polemics we want our framework to describe (Sec. 3). In Sec. 4 we propose the
basic conceptual distinctions for formal framework to represent polemics. After a quick
review of developments from the ArgMAS community that are relevant to this proposal
(Sec.5), we enumerate some areas of opportunity in Sec. 6, and finish the paper with
brief closing remarks.
2 Motivation
In everyday language, a polemic is an exchange of opinions —usually belligerent— in
which individuals or organisations propose, defend or attack some action or opinion
that these stakeholders find disputable. Since we want to stay away from an under-
standing of polemics as a “parasitic figure of disputation”, we propose to establish a
restricted notion that allows for a good description of the disputed issues and the ar-
gumentation involved. We propose to restrict a polemic to be a public exchange of
dialogical arguments around a commitment to perform actions towards a particular out-
come. Consequently, in loose terms, we assume that the statements are controversial
—therefore, may be attacked or defended— and that the exchange is not subject to an
agreed upon protocol, however we presume that some statements may be reified as a
coherent disputation or dialogue. We presume that the action proposal is made within
the context of a public policy that is active and whose stakeholders are bound to its
observance. For that reason we do assume that for some statements to be effective in
the polemic, the identity of some agents is true and known. However, we do not assume
that those who participate in a polemic are bound to a code of honour, truthfulness or
logical consistency.
In other words, we assume that a polemic has the following distinctive features:
– it involves several positions in conflict;
– several controversial issues may be debated at a given point of the polemic and in
their disputation several types of dialogue may be intertwined;
– dialectical exchanges happen within an institutional framework that involves norms,
regulations, organisations, individual and collective roles, ...;
– the main polemical issue changes over time;
– dialectical exchanges are affected by “reality”, mainly because time passes and
events —that may be directly related to the polemic (a riot, regulation) or extrane-
ous (a natural disaster)— happen;
– the outcome of the polemic has real consequences (for example, as a consequence
of an ongoing polemic the construction of an airport is suspended or the airport is
constructed) and, moreover, some dialectical exchanges that take place during the
polemic may also have a real consequence (a threat to call a demonstration may
force the resignation of public officers).
We claim, first, that the topic is fertile because those distinguishing features we
mentioned are amenable to clear formulation and eventually to proper formal and tech-
nological treatment.
Secondly, we claim the topic is challenging because of the complexity of those
features that distinguish polemics from conventional disputation involve substantial in-
novation as well as non-trivial extensions of current state of the art in argumentation
theory and its technological support.
We also claim that the topic is relevant for the ArgMAS community because of
two reasons that we shall address in Sec 6. First, that the community has several tools
and techniques that may be extended to address those challenges that are peculiar to
polemics; second, because some of those challenges are close to recent concerns and
efforts of the ArgMAS community.
Our proposal is guided by the will to develop two complementary outcomes, in
one hand, a conceptual framework to make a polemic intelligible to those individuals
who observe or participate in it and, on the other hand, the development of technolog-
ical artefacts that facilitate the interpretation of an on-going polemic and eventually
articulate and facilitate the participation in it, in real time.
Finally, we claim that the effort is of value to society because: (i) polemics are
frequent and unavoidable in a democratic society; (ii) polemics have an impact on sev-
eral individuals and sometimes this impact can be serious; (iii) polemical disputations
usually requires the investment of substantial social energy and may therefore entail
important direct and opportunity social costs.
3 Examples of polemics
In order to motivate and illustrate some components of our framework, we will use a
toy version of the polemic inspired by the London Shard Tower.3
Picture a polemic that starts when the city government of a large city—like London—
with an emblematic location —like Hyde Park— announces that it has decided to sell
the location to a group of foreign investors that want to build a one thousand meter tall
skyscraper, the tallest ever. Let’s call this proposal S.
The announcement of S is officially made public (perhaps in the government gazette)
and includes (i) the grounds (the city is broke; S will bring enough income to save the
city finances and will foster local growth and employment; the city council is entitled
to sell the land) and (ii) warrants (the list of norms and regulations that validate the
entitlement) for the decision. The moment the public becomes aware of S, there is a
strong and confusing social reaction both in pro and against it. There is a realisation
that key information about the building project is lacking and several stakeholders —
for instance, legislators, spokespersons for the judiciary system, mayoral employees,
land developers, political and special interest groups and associations, citizens that find
their interests affected— are brought into the debate.
3 Manuel Appert, Skyline policy: the Shard and London’s high-rise debate,
Metropolitics, 14 December 2011. http://www.metropolitiques.eu/
Skyline-policy-the-Shard-and.html
After a flurry of public statements, newscasts, editorials and twitts, the debate settles
around a few main issues: transparency of the decision, relevance of the purported war-
rants, actual economic benefits of the project, effect on the environment and the urban
landscape, tradition and patriotic feelings, alternative solution to the financial problems
of the city. Stakeholders adopt positions in favour or against those issues and propose
and take different actions: for example, bring suit against officials for breaking a law,
request environmental impact assessments, publish editorials and in-depth studies, con-
vene demonstrations, ...
Evidently, in many cases polemical exchange is not a standard argumentation pro-
cess. Not infrequently, public statements are made and social actions are taken with
the intention of forcing the dispute into institutional terms that could be resolved in
an aseptic legal context (e.g. demand that an environmental impact assessment has to
be submitted because some regulation says so). However, this is not always possible
or convenient for stakeholders who take to deception, hinting at corruption, threaten-
ing to bring suit, calling for a strike, in order to make stakeholders positions shift; and
thus force changes upon rivals that would be unnecessary or even questionable from
a strict institutional perspective. Moreover, supporters and antagonists of the proposal
may open several argumentation lines that may not be resolved institutionally. Hence,
at some points of a polemic, the argumentative threads that are active may be numer-
ous and also thoroughly intertwined. Not withstanding such argumentative complexity,
in polemics like this one, the emotional and eristic content of the disputation is a key
rhetorical component.
Although, this example is somewhat contrived, actual polemics are not all that dif-
ferent in flavour, content, structure and opacity for participants and observers. This can
readily be seen in well documented real cases, for example in the following two classes:
1. Contentious projects for public works that comport significant economic or social
consequences. For instance, (i) The proposal to build the Franklin-Below-Gordon dam,
that was cancelled in 1983 after a five-year polemic involving one of the most significant
environmental campaigns in Australia4 (ii)The turbulent construction of Narita airport
in Japan (1966-1982) 5 or (iii) The construction of the Keystone Pipeline System in the
US.6
2. Political quarrels associated with demands that involve major practical conse-
quences for the general population or to a particular community. For example, (i) the
Scottish and the Catalan claims to call a referendum7; or (ii) the Greek debt crisis.8
How can a citizen or a stakeholder make sense of what is in question? What is at
stake? Who holds what position and why? And more importantly, what should this per-
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franklin_Dam_controversy
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narita_International_Airport#
Construction
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keystone_Pipeline
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottish_independence_
referendum,_2014 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catalan_
self-determination_referendum,_2014
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_government-debt_crisis
son do when given an opportunity to influence upon the question? Currently, significant
polemics like the ones just mentioned, become intelligible ex-post and off-line and only
through ad-hoc socio-economic-historical analysis. We presume that it is feasible and
worthwhile developing conceptual tools that help identify the building blocks of the
polemic and how these become articulated as the controversy progresses. Moreover,
we also presume that it is feasible and worthwhile to develop technological tools that
profiting from those, facilitate the intelligibility of this type of collective process.
4 Sketching a conceptual framework for polemics
As suggested in Fig. 1, we propose to understand a polemic as a phenomenon that
happens within an institutional framework and may be observed from three interrelated
levels of abstraction. In what follows we shall look into these elements in some detail.
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Fig. 1: A Polemic as a three layer process within an institutional framework
4.1 The institutional framework
The examples of the polemics we mentioned above presuppose an institutional context
that includes: (i) a set of explicit norms that forbid, allow or oblige certain actions un-
der given circumstances, (ii) a set of established procedures that have to be followed in
order to accomplish some results (for instance, procurement regulations, conflict reso-
lution procedures, validation an environmental impact assessment, etc.), (iii) stockhold-
ers with legitimate entitlements to intervene in the polemic, and (iv) a legal system that
takes care of legal interpretation and enforcement.
In our proposal we want to include an institutional context but narrow it down in
order to constrain the polemic within the bounds of a public policy. This way we can
represent the public policy as an institution [13, 14, 19], so that we may count on clear
warrants for entitlements of some clearly established roles, the essential regulated stan-
dard procedures and the corresponding enforcement mechanisms. Thus, loosely speak-
ing, the public policy institution involves norms, procedures, regulations, roles, organ-
isations (political parties, unions, NGOs,...), governance devices (due process, law en-
forcement mechanisms,...), social practices, social norms, adequacy metrics, and val-
ues. In some cases (like a referendum for independence) the institutional context of the
public policy may become itself part of the polemic and in such cases one would make
reference to institutional frameworks of higher legal rank that contain it (e.g. constitu-
tional, supranational).
4.2 Three levels of abstraction and their relationships
We hold that a polemic involves three interrelated spaces: The polemical proposal (P),
the controversy about that proposal (C) and the relevant facts, events and actions in
the physical world (W). These are immersed in a core institution, the public policy
framework that restricts and conditions the polemic, which in turn is immersed in a
wider institutional framework that conforms society and pertinent reality (Fig. 1).
Level P: The polemical proposal. This level consists of a declaration δ by a legitimate
stakeholder of the commitment to carry an action towards an ostensible goal. It is con-
ditioned by the public policy institution. It may evolve as a result of the controversy
and may eventually be withdrawn, made impossible or accomplished. In our example,
δ is S, which starts the polemic and evolves as the polemical exchanges forces the city
council to change it.
Level C: The controversy. Contains speech acts that are organised into dialogues which
in turn give rise to issues and positions[20, 21].
In our example, a news editorial may draw attention to the potential impact on
the city skyline, thus involving stakeholders like urban planners, architects and public
figures into a number of “dialogues” over this issue. One dialogue may be a negotiation
amongst authorities, constructors and detractors over the profile of the tower; another
dialogue might be to elucidate the details of the financial aspects of the project, while
an eristic dialogue may arise to bring the major down.
Dialogues may be of different types: eristic, deliberation, negotiation, inquiry, per-
suasion, information seeking [21] (as is in our example) that involve arguments. Ar-
guments are either atomic or not. Atomic arguments are speech acts that correspond
to an event or action that takes place in level W. Non atomic arguments have a basic
structure that includes four types of components a claim which is sustained by the other
components: grounds (premises, atomic arguments, other claims), warrant (inference,
pertinence, norm or regulation, ...) and qualification (certainty, number, power,...) (Fig.
2) whose actual content depends on the type of dialogue [20].
Claims —that have been established by dialogues or an acknowledged event— may
be organised as issues (which may give rise to new dialogues) and positions with respect
to δ that are backed by stakeholders who become (in principle) committed to those
claims (modulo, tricking, disloyalty, lying or other dialogue defeating practices).
Dialogues are usually intertwined and not always neatly interleaved. The reason
for this being that grounds, warrant and qualification are supported by events (which
take place in Level W) and claims. Claims, in turn, are usually sustained by or become
relevant for other dialogues (Fig. 3). Walton [22] addresses the problem of dialogue
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Fig. 2: Basic argument structure (after Toulmin)
shifting and embedding, features that are certainly part of this intertwining; however
the structure of polemical arguments may be messier because of the forward and back-
ward branching connections between claims, the intervention of several parties in the
different dialogues and the concomitance of dialogues that share claims or parties.
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Fig. 3: Interleaving of dialogues. Claims sustained in one, may be used in other dia-
logues or become “commitments” for some stakeholder’s position
Level W: The world of actual individuals, facts, events and actions. This includes,
firstly, individuals who actively participate in the polemic, playing individual or collec-
tive roles, and have direct interests in the consequences of δ and its derived effects in the
world. Secondly, there are physical facts, events and actions that are of two kinds: those
that are a consequence of exchanges in C and those that happen independently of C but
become relevant for C because they are used in a dialogue. We recognise as elements
of W those physical objects that may be reified as claims or dialogical moves: news-
paper articles, expert opinions, impact assessment reports, putting someone in prison, a
demonstration. Notice that passage of time is of significant consequence in a polemic
because actions and commitments may depend on a timely execution (e.g., procedures
may impose deadlines).
4.3 Interrelationships among levels
The three spaces are interrelated through a complex type of “counts as” relationship
[19, 9].
1. From C to P, there needs to be a valid claim κ (in C) that is consistent with δ and is
admitted by the issuer of δ or another equally or more qualified individual. When
κ is taken into account and properly declared, δ is changed into a new proposal δn
that leads the polemic from then onwards. In our example, for instance, the major
may be forced by a judge’s ruling to modify the height of the tower, thus changing
S into Sn.
– Although the change of δ may be forced by a proper argumentation process —
the judge comes to the ruling that forces Sn through due process— the issuer
of δ may be forced to change it because of the rhetorical situation produced
by an eristic dialogue or, in many cases, by mere accumulation of claims by
significant stakeholders around a particular issue. For instance, expert reports,
newspaper articles and a demonstration around the environmental impact of
S may motivate the major to declare Sn even when it is not compelled by a
norm.
– This is a noteworthy aspect of polemical argumentation that is not accounted
for in classical dialectics. Claims, positions and changes in the main proposal
may change because of rhetorical force of arguments; and that rhetorical force
is not necessarily reflected in a proper dialogue or standard argumentation
schema. However, in polemical disputation sometimes rivals want to force
some issues into an argumentation process that is properly enforced, and there-
fore invoke established procedures —and the corresponding dialectical rules—
that are part of the institutional framework to reach settlements on those terms.
– The motivation for that and other types of strategic behaviour is perhaps also
an aspect of polemics that is worth studying.
2. From P to C: δ and δn are regular speech acts but in order to exist in level C, they
need to be grounded in W, so that the speaker has authority, and the contents of δ
and δn are consistent with the current state of the world.
3. From W to C. Events and actions (α) in W are labelled as speech acts φ that
come into C as atomic arguments when they are deemed pertinent for a dialogue
or a position by an entitled stakeholder. Notice, however that the same α may be
(mis)labelled as more than one speech act φi in C when interpreted by different
stakeholders with different rhetorical intentions in mind. Thus, a demonstration α
may be interpreted by a newspaper as an atomic argument—a “very large number
of citizens” —against the issue size of the building and labelled φ1, and the same
demonstration may be labelled φ2 by the major as a a failure of the opposition to
proove enough popular support against S.
4. From C to W. As Searle and Sergot & Jones ([19, 9]) state, institutional actions
(speech acts) may produce facts or events in W, that in turn may trigger other events
that may be brought into the polemic as new speech acts. A threat by a prominent
environmentalist to call for a demonstration (φ in C) is picked up by a reporter and
published (α in W) and sympathisers react to the news by organising a march (β in
W) that is brought into C as a new atomic argument ψ.
5 Some related work
The Research Challenges for Argumentation Workshop held in Dagstuhl in 2008, [5],
made an important contribution sketching some of the new argumentation research ar-
eas and projects being developed since then related to the context of the world wide
web new applications and research trends, like semantic web, social networks, crowd
computing. In the area of Web Semantics, a significant work has been done around the
definition of a core ontology of argument related concepts, the Argument Interchange
Format, AIF [15], [4]. This ontology has been used in the design of multiusers open
argumentation systems based in multiagent technology [23], [2].
In areas of social networks and crowd computing, several collaborative web based
versions of one user argumentation systems have been presented in recent years. Ba-
sically there are systems for deliberative argumentation, covering different aspects of
the main options of such type of dialog. Among the systems designed to organize open
deliberative massive discussion, at least two systems have been used in large debates:
Debategraph 9 and Deliberatorium [10]. Both systems allow open deliberations based
on visual maps about complex issues.
In a recent paper Walton et.al. [24], propose a new deliberation model for open
settings on the web. In this paper they extend the Deliberation Dialogue Framework
(DDF) model of McBurney et.al. [12], to include two major issues of real deliberation
processes. The first issue is about changes in time. During a real deliberation process,
circumstances can change, as well as new information can be obtained. The main issue
here, from our point of view, is that deliberation is an open process that evolves over
time as a result of changes in the environment and the availability of new information.
The DDF model conceives as part of the deliberation process the embedding of infor-
mation seeking and persuasion dialogs. In their proposal Walton et. al. introduce the
possible changes in information during a deliberation as the result of the information-
seeking phase. The second extension they propose to the DDF model, is the definition
of a set of criteria to determine if a deliberation ends successfully or not.
The Carneades [7] system is designed for legal applications dealing with delibera-
tion processes in public policy. It differs from Deliberatorium [10] particularly because
it is not design to harvest the collective wisdom like Deliberatorium, but instead, its
aim is to facilitate the understanding of complex legal issues on public policy for non-
specialists. This translation is made by specialists or trainee people, while the participa-
tion of common citizens is mainly through their participation in polls. A new version of
Carneades system provides web-based collaborative tools to help different kind of users
9 http://debategraph.org/home
to work on legal argumentations through a central database of arguments graphs and a
set of different tools for modeling argumentation schemes, construct argument graphs,
navigating argument graphs, participating in polls, etc.
6 Areas of opportunity
As suggested before, polemics is an important topic in the daily life of society and
deserves to be studied from a multidisciplinary approach where argumentation, agent
and multiagent technologies could play a key part. The complexity of scenarios in social
polemics may be seen as an inviting area of opportunity to develop new theories and
new technologies around an unavoidable social phenomenon. To achieve this complex
task we list below some of the challenges we find evident and put them in the context
of the related work.
1. Make the framework precise. Starting from some well documented real case stud-
ies, a theoretical framework should be drawn to represent a polemic properly —
providing elements to identify events and speech acts, and their interrelationships
as recurrent patterns or schemes; and to bring support to socio-cognitive systems
that may serve individuals to participate in an on-line polemic.10 Along these lines
we may want to explore other notions akin to polemics that restrict or extend the
framework or for which a more practical or useful labelling or automation is feasi-
ble.
2. The role of time. Time is one of the main components of polemics. It is also one
of the main differences with most of the work done till now in argumentation [20,
22, 18]. Polemics are extremely dynamic phenomena; many things are occurring
concurrently at different levels, events as technical evaluations, court processes,
or a demonstration can have different life cycles, and the debates of each one of
the different issues of the polemic has its own dynamic. The duration of a demon-
stration is much shorter than the construction of a Tower or a lawsuit process. As
above-mentioned, in a recent paper Walton, Toniolo and Norman, [24], address the
need of taking into account the importance of the dynamics of changes in the avail-
able information in the deliberation process. It is an example of how real problems
produce new insights.
3. Understanding the institutional framework. In the context of polemics we need to
understand how the institutional framework works. Can a public policy be under-
stood as an institution? We claim that the approach of Searle to the constituent
concepts of an Institution such as the collective assignment of function, and the
collective assignment of a status such as “X counts as Y in context C”, can be use-
ful to understand the highly complex situations arising in a polemic scenario [19].
For example, after a demonstration a group decides to assign the status of their
10 For example, one might say that a δ in P is a commitment Cstit < α, authority, σ, pi > by
an individual α with institutional power to establish the commitment to see to it that a state of
the world σ is achieved through a plan pi. In which case, an attack to δ would be an attack to σ
or an attack to pi, and δ would change into δ1 if and only if one such attack succeeds and the
institutional framework compels the change.
spokesperson to Jane. So by the use of the collective assignment function: X counts
as Y in context C, they agree on the collective commitment (see for example [8]).
Institutional framework includes the mechanism to deal with social disputes like
the rules of the civil law. We could think that within this framework any dispute
should be processed and solved. Unfortunately, social life is more complex and,
even if there is an ongoing litigation in court, you may have other related events,
in W, and social argumentations, in C, at the same time. We could say, in some
sense that polemics assemble the institutional and social disputes. How are these
two worlds related? This is one of the main issues to apprehend if we want to be
able to create some tools to make easier the understanding of a Polemic.
4. Argumentation theory. Argumentation theory provides the core ideas for the frame-
work we propose. For instance, in the context of a polemic the defeasibility of
reasoning should be rule [20, 21]. The dialectical shifts and dialogs embedding
discussed by Walton [21] should be studied in this new type of argumentation
environment. An interesting question is how these relationships among different
types of dialog work in multilateral controversies, where the events level W af-
fect the dialogical exchanges in C (and viceversa). A huge demonstration against
the tower construction project could be interpreted as a rhetorical situation [3]
that might have an impact on the controversy level. What is the role of rhetoric in
Polemics? Another classical issue in argumentation is fallacies. In this new scenario
one should study how classical fallacies behave in on-line polemics and whether
new types of fallacies appear. Polemics add complexity to the classical argumenta-
tion framework that should provide grounds for innovation.
5. The use of new trends on Argumentation and Multiagent systems research. As men-
tioned in the related work section the new trends outlined in Dagstuhl Manifesto
[5], are now well established research topics: argumentation and the semantic web
[4, 16, 15, 23]; argumentation and decision support in application [17, 11]; argu-
mentation and multiagent systems [18, 1]; and argumentation and social networks
[11]. We find that all these areas play a role in polemics, and polemics would con-
stitute an appropriate ground for innovation in those fields.
6. Tools. Our aim is to develop a framework to make a polemic intelligible to those in-
dividuals who observe it or participate in it. Much work should be done integrating
the lessons learned in projects like Deliberatium, Carneades and Debategraph and
to build new ones to deal, for instance, with the labelling of the commitments and
positions during the controversy. Since our aim is to build artefacts that should help
citizens to be aware and understand the state of a polemic on line, those aspects of
information design, usability and ergonomics in general must be focal points for
future work.
7 Closing remarks
Our intention in this paper was to motivate the topic of polemics and give a taste of
the type of formal and technical challenges that are open. This is evidently a topic for
multidisciplinary approaches in which agent-based systems may play a synergetic role.
It is also a topic where questions of remarkable complexity are open and many more
shall be.
Our first concern is to develop the means to identify those elements that are rele-
vant in a controversy and provide means to organise these. In addition, we propose to
explore the construction of technological artefacts that may support identification and
organisation of those relevant elements.
We made an attempt to identify salient challenges that this problem domain rises.
We provided some indication that these challenges may be adopted by the computa-
tional dialectics community, partly because some of the concerns we have expressed
are also in the mind of some colleagues but also because we understand that much of
what remains to be done may very well build on what is available in classical dialec-
tics and informal logic, and also on what has already been developed by the ArgAS
community along the lines of agent-based argumentation, agreement technologies and
socio-cognitive systems.
We want to apply these conceptual and technological tools to real controversies.
We are aware of the complexity of that objective but we are aware also of the social
significance of making sense out of the apparent chaos of a real polemic. Hence, in
addition to the richness and challenging features of this problem we want to stress the
fact that we are looking for a practical as well as altruistic objective: a way to empower
citizens. The ArgMAS community is particularly well positioned to contribute to this
end.
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